<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Null-Byte Injection on Aonan Guan</title><link>https://oddguan.com/tags/null-byte-injection/</link><description>Recent content in Null-Byte Injection on Aonan Guan</description><generator>Hugo -- 0.147.7</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 20 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://oddguan.com/tags/null-byte-injection/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Second Time, Same Sandbox: Another Anthropic Claude Code Network Sandbox Bypass Enables Data Exfiltration</title><link>https://oddguan.com/blog/second-time-same-sandbox-anthropic-claude-code-network-allowlist-bypass-data-exfiltration/</link><pubDate>Wed, 20 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://oddguan.com/blog/second-time-same-sandbox-anthropic-claude-code-network-allowlist-bypass-data-exfiltration/</guid><description>For the second time in five months, Anthropic Claude Code&amp;#39;s network sandbox lets a process inside reach hosts the user&amp;#39;s policy says to block, and exfiltrate any data the process touches. Every Claude Code release from 2.0.24 (sandbox GA on 2025-10-20) through 2.1.89 was vulnerable to a SOCKS5 hostname null-byte injection. About 5.5 months and ~130 versions, including the release that silently fixed the first sandbox bypass. Both findings ended in a silent fix and no Claude Code security advisory.</description></item></channel></rss>