Memory MCP Server capability laundering: bypassing approval gates through MCP side effects

Capability Laundering in MCP: Anthropic Memory Server to Terminal Hijacking

What Happened Anthropic’s Memory MCP Server is designed to help AI agents remember information across conversations by storing entities in a knowledge graph JSON Lines (JSONL) file. According to its documentation, each entity should only contain name, entityType, and observations. However, the vulnerable implementation accepted and stored additional properties beyond what was documented. That turned “memory persistence” into arbitrary JSON injection, enabling persistent VS Code configuration injection and terminal profile hijacking. ...

December 27, 2025 · 8 min · 1647 words · Aonan Guan
CVE-2025-66479: The CVE That Claude Code Never Got

CVE-2025-66479: Anthropic's Silent Fix and the CVE That Claude Code Never Got

allowedDomains: [], “Empty array = no network access.” — Anthropic Sandbox Runtime Documentation The implementation did not match the documentation. When I configured Claude Code’s sandbox with allowedDomains: [], expecting complete network isolation, the sandbox was wide open and allowed connections to any server on the internet. Anthropic patched this quietly in Claude Code v2.0.55 with a changelog entry saying “Fix proxy DNS resolution” — no mention of a critical security flaw. They assigned CVE-2025-66479 to their runtime library but did not assign a CVE to their flagship product Claude Code. The changelog did not include a security advisory. In practice, the issue was fixed quietly and most users were unlikely to realize there was a security patch. ...

December 3, 2025 · 6 min · 1138 words · Aonan Guan