<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>AI Agent Security on Aonan Guan</title><link>https://oddguan.com/tags/ai-agent-security/</link><description>Recent content in AI Agent Security on Aonan Guan</description><generator>Hugo -- 0.147.7</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 15 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://oddguan.com/tags/ai-agent-security/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Comment and Control: Prompt Injection to Credential Theft in Claude Code, Gemini CLI, and GitHub Copilot Agent</title><link>https://oddguan.com/blog/comment-and-control-prompt-injection-credential-theft-claude-code-gemini-cli-github-copilot/</link><pubDate>Wed, 15 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://oddguan.com/blog/comment-and-control-prompt-injection-credential-theft-claude-code-gemini-cli-github-copilot/</guid><description>Anthropic Claude Code Security Review, Google Gemini CLI Action, and GitHub Copilot Agent are vulnerable to prompt injection via GitHub comments — turning PR titles, issue bodies, and issue comments into attack vectors for API key and token theft.</description></item></channel></rss>